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Abstract—With increasing connectivity among comprising
agents or (sub-)systems in large, complex systems, there is a
growing interest in understanding interdependent security and
dealing with inefficiency in security investments. Making use of a
population game model and the well-known Chung-Lu random
graph model, we study how one could encourage selfish agents to
invest more in security by internalizing the externalities produced
by their security investments.
To this end, we first establish an interesting relation between
the local minimizers of social cost and the Nash equilibria of a
population game with slightly altered costs. Secondly, under a
mild technical assumption, we demonstrate that there exists a
unique minimizer of social cost and it coincides with the unique
Nash equilibrium of the population game. This finding tells us
how to modify the private cost functions of selfish agents in
order to enhance the overall security and reduce social cost.
In addition, it reveals how the sensitivity of overall security
to security investments of agents influences their externalities
and, consequently, penalties or taxes that should be imposed
for internalization of externalities. Finally, we illustrate how the
degree distribution of agents influences their security investments
and overall security at both the NEs of population games and
social optima.
Index Terms—Game theory, interdependent security, internal-
ization of externalities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, many engineering, financial and social systems (e.g.,
the Internet, power grids, equity and commodity markets,
and social networks) are highly connected. In such systems,
the security of an individual, organization or system is often
dependent not only on its own security measures, but also
on those of others.1 This is dubbed interdependent security
(IDS) by Heal and Kunreuther [19], and arises naturally
in many areas including cybersecurity [8], [21], [28], [29],
cyber-physical systems security (e.g., power grids) [2], [9],
epidemiology [35], [37], financial networks and systems [5],
[10], [11], homeland security [18], [24], and supply chain
and transportation system security (e.g., airline security) [14],
[19], [22], [23]. Given the increasing connectivity among the
systems comprising critical infrastructures (e.g., smart grids),
IDS has emerged as an active and vital research area.
The coupling or interdependence in security among agents
in IDS is often modeled using a dependence graph: the
nodes are agents, and the existence of an (undirected) edge
between two nodes signals interdependence of their security.
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1We refer to individuals, organizations and even countries in these settings
as agents.
Some of key challenges to tackling IDS in large networks
or systems are: (i) participating agents are often strategic and
are interested only in their own security or objectives, rather
than the security or cost of the overall system, (ii) when an
agent invests in security measures, it produces externalities
and network effects for its neighbors, and (iii) any attempt
to model detailed interactions among many strategic agents
suffers from the curse of dimensionality.
Let us illustrate some of these concepts and motivations for
our study using following examples.
E1. Spread of malware through emails: When a user is
infected by malware, it can scan the user’s emails or the hard
disk drive of the infected machine and send the user’s personal
or other confidential information to criminals interested in
stealing, for instance, the user’s identify (ID) or trade secrets.
Moreover, the malware can browse the user’s address book
and either forward it to attackers or send out bogus emails,
i.e., email spoofing, with a link or an attachment to those on
the contact list. When a recipient clicks on the link or opens
the attachment, it too becomes infected.
In order to reduce the risks or threats from malware, users
can install an anti-malware utility on their devices. When a
user adopts an anti-malware tool, not only does it reduce its
own risk, but it also curbs the risk to those on its address
book for the reason stated above, thereby protecting its friends
to some degree. Therefore, it produces positive externalities
for others [39], [41]. Interestingly, these positive externalities
diminish the value of installing anti-malware utilities for
others, thus introducing negative network effects for them.
E2. Organizational networks: Organizational information net-
works are typically protected by various security measures,
including replication of data storage and information, net-
work monitoring systems and incoming traffic monitoring.
The choices of employed security measures may depend on
the magnitude of potential financial and other losses (e.g.,
damages to reputation), desired network/system dependability
as well as available budget for security investments [3].
Organizational networks are interconnected and, in many
cases, share information. Thus, when some networks are
more vulnerable, they may serve as a stepping stone for
sophisticated hackers to gain a foothold inside the network and
ultimately access to even better protected high-value targets by
using known vulnerabilities [1] or zero-day exploits [7].
It is well documented [4], [16], [40] that the selfish nature of
agents leads to inefficiency in many settings, including under-
investments in security, thanks to free riding in part caused by
positive externalities illustrated in the first example. Therefore,
researchers have been searching for ways to improve overall
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2security, including cyberinsurance and incentive mechanisms
to increase the security investments by selfish agents (e.g.,
[20], [21], [29], [34], [44]).
One promising approach to enhancing overall security is
through internalization of externalities [41], which is the
focus of this paper. This requires altering the (private) cost
of agents so that their costs reflect their contribution to the
social cost. A key challenge to implementing this lies in
correctly quantifying the externalities produced by each agent
and accounting for them in its cost function.
We aim to explore (a) how we can measure (or approximate)
the externalities generated by agents and signal them correctly
to the agents, and (b) how the sensitivity of overall security
to the security investments of agents shapes the externalities
and, hence, penalties/taxes that ought to be levied on them (as
a part of their cost functions) to internalize their externalities.
In particular, we are interested in scenarios with many agents
in large networks and systems.
To this end, we consider scenarios where malicious entities
or attackers launch attacks against agents, for example, in
hopes of infecting/taking control of machines or gaining
unauthorized access to private information of victims. Not
only can agents suffer damages or losses from direct attacks
by attackers, but the victims of successful direct attacks may
also unknowingly help the attackers unleash indirect attacks
on their neighbors.
We assume that the agents are rational and interested in
minimizing their own costs. In the face of possible attacks,
they manage their risks by investing in a number of security
measures. Unfortunately, it is hard to model the details of
strategic interactions among many agents due to the curse of
dimensionality.
In order to skirt this difficulty, we employ a population
game model [36] with the help of the so-called Chung-Lu
random graph model [13]. A population game is often used to
study strategic interactions between a large number of agents,
possibly from different populations. This novel framework
allows us to examine the network- or system-level security
in IDS settings with many comprising agents.
We adopt a well known solution concept, namely Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the population game, as an approximation
to agents’ behavior in practice. Our goal is to understand
how the NEs of population games are related to the social
optima with the objective of identifying a potential means
of internalizing the externalities produced by agents’ security
investments.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
1) We reveal an intriguing relation between the NEs of
population games and social optima. More specifically,
we show that any local minimizer of social cost is a pure-
strategy NE of a slightly modified population game in
which agents’ cost functions are altered to account for
the externalities brought on by their security decisions.
Therefore, the set of local minimizers of social cost is
contained in the set of pure-strategy NEs of the modified
population game (Section V-C).
2) Using this relation, we establish under a mild technical
condition that there exists a unique pure-strategy NE of
the aforementioned modified population game and it co-
incides with the unique (global) minimizer of social cost,
without requiring convexity of social cost (Section V-D).
3) We demonstrate that an agent with a fixed degree suffers
fewer attacks both at an NE of the population game
and at a social optimum as the weighted node degree
distribution of the dependence graph (with node degrees
as weights) becomes stochastically larger [38]. Hence,
as the dependence graph becomes more connected, in-
dicating a higher level of interdependence in security,
a fixed-degree node will likely experience better local
security (Section VI).
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first study
to examine the possibility of internalizing externalities, based
on the relation between the NEs of noncooperative games and
social optima with many agents in IDS settings. It is true that
our study is conducted using a simplified model under several
assumptions for analytical tractability. For this reason, it is not
our intention to claim that our model accurately represents the
complex reality and the quantitative aspects of our findings
will hold in practice.
Instead, our hope is that even this simple model will help
us develop valuable insight into the qualitative nature of
(aggregate) behavior of agents with help of analytical findings.
Furthermore, our findings will likely shed some light on (a)
how we can improve the overall security via internalization
of externalities and (b) how the underlying interdependency
of security among agents affects the security experienced by
them and in turn influences their security investments in more
realistic settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly
summarize some of existing studies that are most closely
related to our study in Section II. Section III describes the
population game model we adopt for our analysis, followed
by some preliminary results in Section IV. Our main findings
on the relation between the NEs of population games and the
local minimizers of social cost as well as the approximation
of (negative) externalities produced by agents are presented in
Section V. The effects of weighted node degree distribution
on local security and negative externalities are reported in
Section VI. Some numerical results are presented in Section
VII. We conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
As mentioned in Section I, Kunreuther and Heal [19],
[23] studied IDS where the security of involved parties is
interdependent. IDS scenarios with strategic agents are often
studied in game theoretic settings, e.g., [17], [21], [22], [30].
We refer an interested reader to a survey paper by Laszka et al.
[27] and references therein for a succinct discussion of these
and other related studies. Here, we focus on several studies that
are most relevant to ours and summarize their main findings.
It is well known that the existence of externalities often
leads to inefficient equilibria due to market failures (e.g., [16],
[44]). In particular, it is shown that positive externalities (resp.
negative externalities) produced by security investments result
in under-investments (resp. over-investments) in security [44].
3In order to address this inefficiency in security investments,
researchers explored various means of internalizing exter-
nalities, including taxation, cyberinsurance, regulations and
coordinating mechanisms [23] with cyberinsurance being a
popular approach extensively studied in the literature [20],
[29], [34], [44].
Lelarge and Bolot [29] studied the problem of incentiviz-
ing organizations to invest in security through taxation and
insurance. They showed that, in the absence of moral hazard,
insurance may be used to encourage organizations to protect
themselves. However, they did not suggest how the issue of
moral hazard can be handled in practice, which is well known
in the insurance field and is difficult to rid of.
Ogut et al. [34] investigated the impact of interdependency
of security on the choices for security investments and cy-
berinsurance. Their findings show that the interdependence of
security tends to reduce the organizations’ incentive to invest
in security measures and cyberinsurance. More importantly,
they suggest that even a more mature or developed cyberinsur-
ance market may not promote cyberinsurance unless the price
of insurance comes down and that the cyberinsurance market
may fail due to correlated damages/incidents caused by risk
interdependency, which can result in catastrophic losses for
insurers.
Hofmann [20] examined the possibility of monopolistic
insurer and demonstrated that insurance monopoly can result
in higher efficiency than a competitive insurance market.
Moreover, the author suggested that the monopolistic insurer
might be able to achieve the social optimum and reduced
losses by exercising premium discrimination even in the case
of imperfect information.
In another interesting study, Zhao et al. [44] considered
two alternative risk management schemes – risk pooling
arrangements (RPAs) and managed security services (MSSs).
They showed that while RPAs can be used to complement
cyberinsurance to address the over-investment issue in the
case of negative externalities from security investments, it is
not effective at coping with under-investments when security
investments generate positive externalities because it is not
incentive-compatible. In addition, not surprisingly, an MSS
provider can internalize the externalities of security invest-
ments. However, the agents have an incentive to outsource
their security management to an MSS provider only when the
number of agents is small. Thus, this approach fails to address
the security investment inefficiency with a large number of
agents.
Naghizadeh and Liu [31] studied the problem of internal-
izing the externalities produced by strategic agents in IDS
games. They proposed an incentive-compatible algorithm that
allows the players to converge to a socially efficient state at an
NE. However, the proposed scheme is not individually rational,
and the existence of an algorithm that simultaneously achieves
i) incentive compatibility, ii) efficiency and iii) individual
rationality remains an open problem.
While the above studies explore different approaches to
internalizing the externalities of security investments, there are
major differences from our study. First, these studies do not
examine the relation between the equilibria of IDS games and
social optima. Second, our model attempts to reflect the un-
derlying dependence graph that captures the interdependence
in security among agents by modeling varying degrees of the
agents, in order to estimate their security risks. The studies
in [20], [34], [44] do not take into account the properties
of underlying dependence graph. Finally, we study how the
degree distribution of agents (in the dependence graph) affects
their security risks and investments as well as the ensuing
externalities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
analytical result that sheds light on how the degree distribution
of dependence graph shapes the resulting network security and
externalities.
We studied a related problem in [25], namely how various
network parameters influence the (global) cascade probability.
We argued that the cascade probability can be considered
a global measure of network security, for it measures how
likely an infection, starting with one or a small number of
initially infected agents, may spread to a large number of
other agents. Not only are the emphasis and findings of [25]
different from those of the current study, but also the model we
employ in [25] is different from that used here in two ways.
First, we allowed only binary security choices to facilitate
the analysis in [25], whereas we consider a continuous action
space representing varying amounts of security investments
in this study. Second, in [25] we assumed a specific way
in which infections can transmit multiple hops and studied
how the infection propagation rate affects resulting cascade
probabilities at the NEs. In the current study, we do not fix
the dynamics of infection propagation through a network.
Instead, we abstract out security risks that agents might
see under different propagation models by using a function
and investigate how the ‘shape’ of the function affects the
externalities of security investments and resulting penalties
necessary to internalize them.
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We capture the (inter-)dependence of security among the
agents using an undirected graph, which we call the depen-
dence graph. A node or vertex in the graph corresponds to an
agent (e.g., an individual or organization), and an undirected
edge between nodes n1 and n2 indicates interdependence of
their security. We interpret an undirected edge as a pair of
directed edges pointing in the opposite directions with an
understanding that a directed edge from node n1 to node n2
indicates that the security of node n1 affects that of node
n2 in the manner we explain shortly. When there is an edge
between two nodes, we say that they are immediate or one-hop
neighbors or, simply, neighbors when it is clear.
We model the interaction among the agents as a non-
cooperative game, in which players are the agents in the
dependence graph.2 This is reasonable because, in many cases,
it may be difficult for agents to cooperate with each other
and take coordinated security measures against attacks. In
addition, even if they could coordinate their actions, they
would be unlikely to do so in the absence of clear incentives
for coordination.
2We will use the words agents, nodes and players interchangeably hereafter.
4We are interested in scenarios where the number of agents
is large. As mentioned earlier, modeling detailed microscale
interactions among many agents in a large network and analyz-
ing ensuing games is difficult; the number of possible strategy
profiles typically increases exponentially with the number of
players and finding the NEs of noncooperative games is often
challenging even with a moderate number of players (the curse
of dimensionality).
For analytical tractability, we employ a population game
model with a continuous action space. Population games
provide a unified framework and tools for studying strategic
interactions among a large number of agents under following
assumptions [36]. First, the choice of an individual agent has
very little effect on the payoffs of other agents. Second, the
payoff of each agent depends only on the distribution of
actions chosen by the members of each population. For a
detailed discussion of population games, we refer an interested
reader to the manuscript by Sandholm [36]. We will follow the
language of [36] throughout the paper.
Our population game does not explicitly capture the link
level interactions between every pair of neighbors in a fixed
dependence graph. Instead, it is a simplification of complicated
reality and only attempts to capture the average or mean
behavior of agents with varying degrees. A key advantage of
this model is that it provides a scalable model that enables us
to study the aggregate behavior of the players, resulting NEs
and social optima, and their relation, regardless of the number
of agents.
A. Population game
We assume that the maximum degree among all play-
ers in the dependence graph is Dmax < ∞. For each
d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Dmax} =: D, sd denotes the size or mass
of population consisting of players with degree d, and the
population size vector s :=
(
sd; d ∈ D
)
tells us the sizes of
populations with varying degrees.
The population size sd does not necessarily represent the
number of agents in population d; instead, an implicit model-
ing assumption of a population game is that each population
consists of so many agents that a population d ∈ D can be
approximated as a continuum of mass or size sd ∈ (0,∞).
Hence, the ratios of population sizes are more important than
the assumed population sizes, as it will be clear.
i. Pure action/strategy space – All players have the identical
(pure) action space A := [Imin, Imax] ⊂ IR+ := [0,∞), where
0 ≤ Imin < Imax <∞. Each pure action in A represents the
amount that an agent invests in security to protect itself. We
denote the set of distributions over A by PA.
ii. Population states and social state – The population state
of population d is given by xd ∈ PA. In other words, given any
Borel subset S ⊆ A, xd(S) tells us the fraction of population
d whose security investment lies in S. The social state consists
of the population states of all populations and is denoted by
x = (xd; d ∈ D) ∈ PDmaxA =: X .
iii. Cost function – The cost function of the game is deter-
mined with the help of a function C : X ×D×A× IRDmax+ →
IR. The interpretation is that, when the population size vector
is s and the social state is x, the cost of a player with degree
d investing a in security is equal to C(x, d, a, s). As we will
show shortly, in addition to the cost of security investments,
our cost function also reflects the (expected) losses from
attacks.
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in exploring a possi-
ble means of improving overall security via internalization of
externalities. Obviously, the externalities produced by players
will depend on the (properties of) dependence graph because
it determines how the security of one agent influences that of
other agents. In order to capture this, we model two different
types of attacks players suffer from – direct and indirect
attacks. While the underlying dependence graph does not
affect the first type of attacks, it influences the latter type,
thereby allowing us to capture the desired network effects
shaped by it.
a) Direct attacks: We assume that attacker(s) launch an
attack against each player with probability τA, independently
of other players.3 We call this a direct attack. When a player
experiences a direct attack, the realized cost depends on its
security investment; when a player adopts action a ∈ A, it
is infected with probability p(a) ∈ [0, 1]. Also, each time a
player is infected, it incurs on the average a loss of L. Hence,
the expected loss due to a single attack for a player with
security investment of a is L(a) := L · p(a).
b) Indirect attacks: Besides the direct attack by a malicious
attacker, a player also experiences indirect attacks from its
neighbors that have sustained a successful attack and are
infected. For instance, malware that successfully infects a user
may scan the user’s address book and either send a malicious
email to those on the contact list or forward the list to a server
that sends out malevolent emails to those on the list.
We assume that an infected agent launches an indirect attack
on each of its immediate neighbors (along the directed edges
to the neighbors) with probability βIA ∈ (0, 1] independently
of each other. We call βIA indirect attack probability (IAP).
When a player suffers an indirect attack, it is infected with
the same probability p(a), where a is its security investment.
Moreover, a player infected by an indirect attack can also
transmit the infection to its neighbors when an infection can
propagate more than one hop.
Baryshnikov [4] showed that, under some technical as-
sumptions, the infection probability (which the author called
security breach probability) is a log-convex (hence, strictly
convex) decreasing function of the investments. The basic
intuition behind this finding is the following: Suppose that
there are many independent security measures an agent can
employ to protect itself (e.g., installation of security software,
traffic monitoring). When the agent is free to choose any
collection of security measures subject to its budget, it should
choose the most effective combination of security measures
which minimizes its security breach probability, leading to a
diminishing return of increasing security investments [16].
3Our model can be altered to capture the intensity or frequencies of attacks
instead, with appropriate changes to cost functions of the players.
5Based on this finding, we introduce the following assump-
tion on the infection probability p(a), a ∈ A. A similar
assumption was used in other studies (e.g., [16], [44]).
Assumption 1: The infection probability p : A → [0, 1]
is continuous, strictly convex and decreasing. Moreover, it is
continuously differentiable over (Imin, Imax).
The IAP affects the local spreading behavior of infections.
Unfortunately, the dynamics of infection propagation in a
network depend on the details of underlying dependence
graph, which are difficult to obtain or model faithfully. In
order to skirt this difficulty, instead of attempting to model
the detailed, microscale dynamics of infection transmissions
between players, we abstract out the (security) risks seen by
players using the (average) number of attacks a player sees
from a single neighbor as explained below.
• Node degree distribution and weighted degree dis-
tribution – We denote the mapping that yields the degree
distribution of populations by f : IRDmax+ → ∆Dmax , where
∆Dmax denotes the probability simplex in IR
Dmax and
fd(s) =
sd∑
d′∈D sd′
, s ∈ IRDmax+ and d ∈ D, (1)
is the fraction of total population with degree d. Similarly,
define w : IRDmax+ → ∆Dmax , where
wd(s) =
d · sd∑
d′∈D d′ · sd′
=
d · fd(s)
davg(s)
, s ∈ IRDmax+ and d ∈ D, (2)
and davg(s) :=
∑
d′∈D d
′ · fd′(s) is the average degree of
nodes. From the above definition, w gives us the weighted
degree distribution of populations, where the weights are the
degrees.
It is easy to show that both f and w are scale invariant.
In other words, f(s) = f(φ · s) and w(s) = w(φ · s) for all
φ > 0. When there is no confusion, we write f , w, and davg
in place of f(s), w(s), and davg(s), respectively.
We first clarify the role of mapping w. Suppose that we fix a
social state x ∈ X and choose a player at random. In addition,
assume that the dependence graph is neutral [32], [33], i.e.,
there are no correlations between the degrees of two neighbors.
In this case, the probability that a randomly picked neighbor
of the player has degree d ∈ D can be approximated using wd
because it is proportional to the degree d [12].4 Hence, we can
approximate the probability that the neighbor has degree d and
its security investment belongs to B ⊆ A using wd · xd(B).
This degree-based model is known as the Chung-Lu model
in the literature [13] and has been used extensively in other
existing studies, e.g., [15], [42], [43]. In particular, Watts in
his seminal paper [42] utilized a similar degree-based model
to study cascades of infection in a network with a given degree
distribution. He demonstrated that the analytical results he
derived using the generating function method based on this
model closely match the numerical results he obtained using
random graphs.
4When a network is either assortative or disassortative, this assumption
does not hold. The effects of assortativity on security is studied in [26].
• Risk exposure – Based on the above observation, we
can model the average number of indirect attacks a node
experiences from a single neighbor, assuming a neutral depen-
dence graph, as follows. First, we approximate the (expected)
total number of one-hop indirect attacks from the victims of
successful direct attacks to their immediate neighbors using
Γ(x; s) := τA · βIA
∑
d∈D
(
d · sd · pd,avg(x)
)
,
where
pd,avg(x) :=
∫
A
p(a) xd(da)
is the probability that a randomly selected node of degree d
will be infected when it experiences an attack. Hence, τA ·
βIA · d · pd,avg(x) can be taken to be the average number of
one-hop indirect attacks that nodes of degree d inflict on their
immediate neighbors.
Define γavg(x; s) to be the average number of one-hop
indirect attacks per directed edge or, equivalently, the frac-
tion of directed edges employed to transmit one-hop indirect
attacks. Then, γavg(x; s) is equal to Γ(x; s) divided by the
total number of directed edges in the dependence graph, i.e.,
γavg(x; s) =
Γ(x; s)∑
d′∈D d′ · sd′
=
τA · βIA
∑
d∈D
(
d · fd(s) · pd,avg(x)
)
davg(s)
(3)
= τA · βIA
∑
d∈D
(
wd(s) · pd,avg(x)
)
,
where the second and third equalities follow from (1) and
(2). Since each directed edge corresponds to a neighbor of
some node, γavg(x; s) is also the likelihood that a node will
see a one-hop indirect attack from a neighbor on a randomly
selected directed edge.
When infections can propagate more than one-hop, i.e.,
beyond immediate neighbors, the manner in which they can
spread through the network will depend on the detailed
structure of the dependence graph. As mentioned earlier, it
is difficult to model the dynamics of propagation accurately
and makes a mathematical analysis challenging, if possible at
all. For this reason, we do not attempt to model the detailed
dynamics of infection transmissions. However, it is reasonable
to expect that, even in general settings, the average number of
indirect attacks a node sees from a single neighbor (including
both one-hop and multi-hop indirect attacks) is increasing in
γavg(x; s). This is formally stated by the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 2: The average number of indirect attacks that
a node experiences from a single neighbor, which we denote
by e(x; s), is equal to g(γavg(x; s)) for some function g :
IR+ → IR+ with g(0) = 0. The function g is continuous,
strictly increasing and differentiable over (0,∞).
We call e(x; s) the risk exposure at social state x and
employ it to quantify and compare the overall risk perceived by
a node with a fixed degree, say d ∈ D, at different social states
or under different network settings. In other words, we use it
6as a measure of local network security from the viewpoint of
a node with a fixed degree.5 It is clear from (3) that e(x; s)
reflects the node degree distribution f(s).
Example: Power function of γavg(x; s) – In this case, the
risk exposure is equal to
e(x; s) = κ · γavg(x; s)b
= κ+
(∑
d∈D
wd(s) · pd,avg(x)
)b
(4)
for some κ, b > 0, where κ+ := κ(τA · βIA)b. Note that∑
d∈D wd(s) · pd,avg(s) is the probability that a randomly
chosen neighbor of a node (with degree distribution w(s) as
explained before) will be infected by a single attack. Hence,
it measures how vulnerable a neighboring node is to an attack
on the average.
The constant κ can be used to capture how far an infection
spreads (e.g., the number of hops) on the average. In other
words, the larger κ is, the farther an infection disseminates
through a network. On the other hand, the parameter b deter-
mines how sensitive the risk exposure is to the likelihood of
a neighbor falling victim to an attack, i.e., the vulnerability of
a neighbor mentioned in the previous paragraph.
We assume that the total cost of a player due to multiple
successful attacks it suffers is additive. The additivity of
costs from different attacks is reasonable in many scenarios,
including the earlier examples of the spread of malware and
corporate networks; each time a user is infected or its ID is
stolen, the user will need to spend time and incur expenses to
deal with the problem. Similarly, when a corporate network is
breached, besides any financial losses or legal expenses, the
network operator will need to assess the damages and take
corrective measures.
Based on this assumption, we adopt the following cost
function for our population game: for any given social state
x ∈ X , the cost of a node with degree d ∈ D investing a ∈ A
in security is equal to
C(x, d, a, s) = (τA + d · e(x; s))L(a) + a. (5)
Note that τA + d · e(x; s) is the expected number of attacks
that a node of degree d experiences, including both direct and
indirect attacks.
We focus on Nash equilibria (NEs) of population games as
an approximation to nodes’ behavior in practice. For every
d ∈ D, define a mapping Aoptd : X × IRDmax+ → B(A), where
B(A) is the set of Borel subsets of A and
Aoptd (x, s) :=
{
a ∈ A | C(x, d, a, s) = inf
a′∈A
C(x, d, a′, s)
}
.
For a fixed population size s, a social state x? is an NE if
x?d(A
opt
d (x
?, s)) = 1 for all d ∈ D. In other words, (almost)
every player adopts a best response.
Key questions we are interested in exploring with help of
the population game model include: (i) Is there any structural
relation between an NE of a population game and a social
5To the best of our knowledge, one of challenges to studying network-level
security is that there are no standard metrics experts agree on for quantifying
network security.
optimum? (ii) If so, what is the relation and how does it depend
on system parameters? (iii) In addition, how can we take
advantage of the relation in order to improve network security?
We shall offer some answers to these important questions in
the following sections.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Before we proceed, let us point out a useful observation.
From (3) - (5), it is clear that the cost function is identical
for two population size vectors s1 and s2 with the same node
degree distribution, i.e., f(s1) = f(s2). This scale invariance
property of the cost function implies that the set of NEs is
identical for both population size vectors. It is also consistent
with an earlier comment that the ratios of population sizes are
more relevant than the absolute population sizes. As a result,
it suffices to consider population size vectors whose sum is
equal to one, i.e.,
∑
d∈D sd = 1. For this reason, without
loss of generality we impose the following assumption in the
remainder of the paper.
Assumption 3: The population size vectors are normalized
so that the total population size is equal to one.
Keep in mind that, under Assumption 3, the node degree
distribution f(s) is equal to the population size vector s, i.e.,
f(s) = s.
For each r ∈ IR+, let Iopt(r) be the set of optimal
investments for a player when it sees r expected attacks. In
other words,
Iopt(r) = arg min
a∈A
(
r · L(a) + a).
Under Assumption 1, the optimal investment is unique, i.e.,
Iopt(r) is a singleton for all r ∈ IR+. Hence, we can view
Iopt : IR+ → A as a mapping that tells us the optimal
security investment that a player should choose as a function
of the total risk it perceives. This means that, at an NE x?,
the population state x?d is concentrated on a single point, i.e.,
x?d({Iopt(τA+d·e(x?; s))}) = 1 for all d ∈ D. Moreover, one
can show from the assumed strict convexity and continuous
differentiability of infection probability p (Assumption 1)
that the optimal investment Iopt(r) is nondecreasing in r
and, if Imin < Iopt(r′) < Imax for some r′ ∈ IR+, then
Iopt(r) > Iopt(r′) (resp. Iopt(r) < Iopt(r′)) for all r > r′
(resp. r < r′).
Define the mapping p? : IR+ → [0, 1] to be the composition
of Iopt : IR+ → A and p : A → [0, 1], i.e., p?(r) = p◦Iopt(r).
Then, together with the assumption that p is strictly decreasing,
the above observation means that p? is nonincreasing.
Corollary 1: If 0 ≤ r1 < r2 < ∞, we have p?(r1) ≥
p?(r2). Furthermore, if Imin < Iopt(r1) < Imax, the inequal-
ity is strict, i.e., p?(r1) > p?(r2).
a) Existence of a pure-strategy NE of a population game:
Throughout the paper, we are often interested in cases in which
the social state is degenerate, i.e., all players with the identical
degree adopt the same action. We denote the action chosen by
population d ∈ D by ad, and refer to a := (ad; d ∈ D) ∈
ADmax as a pure strategy profile.
7With a little abuse of notation, we denote the risk exposure
when a pure strategy profile a is employed by
e(a; s) := g
(
τA βIA
∑
d∈D
(
wd(s) · p(ad)
))
. (6)
Recall that
∑
d∈D wd(s) · p(ad) = w(s)Tp(a), where p(a) =
(p(ad); d ∈ D), is the vulnerability of a neighbor, i.e., the
likelihood that a randomly chosen neighbor of a node will
be infected when attacked. We shall denote w(s)Tp(a) by
ρ(a; s) in the rest of paper, and rewrite g(τA βIA ρ(a; s))
as g+(ρ(a; s)). In other words, we define the mapping g+ :
IR+ → IR+ to be g+(z) = g(τA βIA z) for all z ∈ IR+,
and it tells us the risk exposure as a function of the neighbor
vulnerability ρ(a; s) = w(s)Tp(a).
Definition 1: A pure strategy profile a′ ∈ ADmax is said to
be a pure-strategy NE if, for all d ∈ D,
a′d = arg min
a∈A
(
(τA + d · e(a′; s))L(a) + a
)
.
Lemma 1: For every population size vector s ∈ IRDmax+ ,
there exists a pure-strategy NE of the corresponding population
game.
Proof: A proof of the lemma is provided in Appendix A.
As discussed earlier, under Assumption 1, for any NE of
a population game, say xNE , there exists a pure strategy
profile a+ such that xNE({a+}) = 1; once the risk exposure
e(xNE ; s) is fixed at the NE, every population has a unique
optimal investment that minimizes its cost given by (5) as
explained before. Obviously, a+ is a pure-strategy NE by
definition. This tells us that all NEs of population games are
pure-strategy NEs.
V. MAIN RESULTS: INTERNALIZATION OF EXTERNALITIES
As mentioned in Section I, an important question in IDS
is how one can encourage selfish agents to make adequate
investments in security in order to improve overall security.
In other words, what types of incentive mechanisms can be
employed, for instance, with the help of regulatory policies,
to incentivize selfish agents so that they would invest more in
security than they would otherwise at an NE? In this section,
we offer a partial answer to this question by exploring how
we may be able to internalize externalities [41].
To this end, we first establish the uniqueness of the (pure-
strategy) NE. Then, we illustrate an intriguing relation between
the set of local minimizers of social cost and the set of pure-
strategy NEs of a related population game. As we will demon-
strate, the latter finding allows us to (i) establish the uniqueness
of a social optimum under a mild technical condition without
requiring the convexity of social cost and (ii) compare the risk
exposures at the unique pure-strategy NE of the population
game and a (local) minimizer of social cost. Our finding
confirms that the selfish nature of players leads to under-
investments in security (due to positive externalities from
security investments). Finally, based on the aforementioned
relation between the local minimizers of social cost and the
pure-strategy NEs of the related population game, we suggest
a possible means of internalizing the externalities caused by
players.
Before presenting our results, we first point out an obvious
consequence of Corollary 1: the optimal investment by a player
at an NE is non-decreasing in its degree. This is because the
average number of attacks seen by a node is strictly increasing
in its degree according to the cost function in (5).
A. Uniqueness of Nash equilibria of population games
Theorem 1: For a fixed population size vector s ∈ IRDmax+ ,
there is a unique (pure-strategy) NE of the population game.
Proof: A proof can be found in Appendix B.
Since there exists a unique NE of a population game and
we measure the (local) security seen by the players using
the risk exposure, we can compare the security at the NEs
under different settings or dependence graphs and also to that
of social optimum. Furthermore, we only need to consider
pure-strategy NEs for our study, which simplifies the analysis
somewhat. For notational convenience, we denote the unique
pure-strategy NE (for a given population size vector s) by
aNE(s) or simply by aNE when there is no confusion.
B. Social optima
We define the overall social cost at social state x ∈ X to be
the aggregate cost of all players, i.e., the sum of (i) expected
losses from attacks and (ii) the costs of security investments
by players, which is given by
CT (x, s) =
∑
d∈D
sd
(∫
A
C(x, d, a, s) xd(da)
)
. (7)
The goal of the social player (SP), e.g., policy designers, is to
minimize the social cost in (7).
In general, the SP could choose a distribution over ADmax
to minimize the social cost. In our study, however, we restrict
its action space to ADmax . In other words, the SP is allowed to
choose only a single investment amount for each population.
We make this assumption for the following two reasons: first,
as shown in the previous subsection, for a fixed population size
vector s, there exists a unique NE, namely pure-strategy NE
aNE . Secondly, perhaps more importantly, from the perspec-
tive of designing a policy, a sound policy should have similar
requirements for nodes that are alike (in our case, nodes with
the same degree).
Given a population size vector s and a pure strategy profile
a ∈ ADmax , we denote the social cost by
C˜T (a, s) =
∑
d∈D
sd · C˜(a, d, s), (8)
where C˜ : ADmax ×D × IRDmax+ → IR with
C˜(a, d, s) = (τA + d · e(a; s))L(ad) + ad. (9)
Then, the SP is interested in solving the following constrained
optimization problem.
SP-OPT PROBLEM:
min
a∈ADmax
C˜T (a, s)
8Generally, without imposing additional conditions, the SP-
OPT PROBLEM need not be convex and its minimizer is not
guaranteed to be unique; this is because e(a; s) = g+(ρ(a; s))
is not assumed to be convex in ρ(a; s) = w(s)Tp(a).
Let ALM (s) be the set of local minimizers of social cost. It
turns out that there is an interesting relation between ALM (s)
and the set of pure-strategy NEs of a closely related population
game with a modified cost function.
C. Related population game with a modified cost function
Consider the following modified population game with a
slightly different cost function Cˆ : ADmax×D×IRDmax+ → IR,
where
Cˆ(a, d, s) (10)
=
(
τA + d(e(a; s) + g˙
+(ρ(a; s)) ρ(a; s))
)
L(ad) + ad
=
(
τA + d ϑ(ρ(a; s))
)
L(ad) + ad
for all d ∈ D and a ∈ ADmax , and ϑ : IR+ → IR+
with ϑ(z) = g+(z) + g˙+(z) · z. The difference between the
cost function in (9) and the above modified cost function
in (10) is that the number of indirect attacks seen from a
single neighbor is scaled up from e(a; s) to ϑ(ρ(a; s)) =
e(a; s) + g˙+(ρ(a; s))ρ(a; s) ≥ e(a; s). Clearly, providing the
additional information regarding g˙+(ρ(a; s))ρ(a; s) may be
problematic in practice. We will revisit this issue shortly.
Even when g+ is strictly increasing, ϑ might not be strictly
increasing. For example, suppose g+(z) = 1− e−z , z ∈ IR+.
It is clear that g+ is strictly increasing. However, ϑ˙(z) =
2g˙+(z) + z · g¨+(z) = (2 − z)e−z . Thus, ϑ˙(z) < 0 when
z > 2, and ϑ(z) is not monotonically increasing in z. As a
result, unlike in the original population game, a (pure-strategy)
NE of the modified population game is not guaranteed to be
unique. We denote by AmcNE(s) the set of pure-strategy NEs
of this modified population game.
Theorem 2: Any local minimizer of social cost is a pure-
strategy NE of the modified population game. Therefore,
ALM (s) ⊆ AmcNE(s).
Proof: A proof is provided in Appendix C.
The theorem leads to a following corollary, which affirms
that free riding by some players at NEs causes a degradation
in network security, which is measured by the risk exposure
in this paper.
Corollary 2: Fix the population size vector s. Let aNE =
aNE(s) and a? ∈ ALM (s) be any local minimizer of social
cost. Then, e(a?; s) ≤ e(aNE ; s).
Corollary 2 tells us that the risk exposure at the NE is
greater than or equal to that of the worst local minimizer.
The intuition behind the corollary is that because a? is a local
(or global) minimizer of social cost, Theorem 2 tells us that
it is a pure-strategy NE of the modified population game in
which all players perceive heightened risks, thereby forcing
them to invest more in security than they would at the NE of
the original population game.
D. Internalization of externalities
Theorem 2 has another, perhaps more practically important
implication for realizing the internalization of externalities,
under a following reasonable assumption.
Assumption 4: The mapping ϑ : IR+ → IR+ is strictly
increasing.
While Assumption 4 does not always hold as we illustrated
earlier, it is likely to hold in practice; a sufficient condition for
the assumption is that g+ is differentiable and z·g+(z) =: h(z)
is strictly convex (note that h˙(z) = z · g˙+(z)+g+(z) = ϑ(z)).
This sufficient condition holds, for instance, if g+ can be
written as a sum of power functions with positive exponents,
i.e., g+(z) =
∑
k ak · zbk for some ak, bk > 0, or g+(z) =
a · log(1 + z) for some a > 0. Furthermore, it is reasonable to
expect that e(a; s) = g+(ρ(a; s)) is at least linearly increasing
in the average number of one-hop indirect attacks, namely
γavg(a; s). Because ρ(a; s) ∝ γavg(a; s)), this suggests that
g+ is likely to be at least linear in ρ(a; s) and Assumption 4
is likely to be satisfied.
Corollary 3: Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Then,
AmcNE(s) is a singleton, i.e., there exists a unique (pure-
strategy) NE of the modified population game, amcNE(s). Con-
sequently, there exists a unique global minimizer of social cost,
which coincides with amcNE(s).
The proof of the corollary is similar to that of Theorem 1
in Appendix B and is omitted here.
Theorem 2, together with Corollary 3, sheds some light on
the structural relation between the (global) minimizer of social
cost and the pure-strategy NE of a related population game
under Assumption 4. Also, it hints at how we might be able to
strengthen network security, for example, by levying penalties
or taxes on the players for indirect attacks they suffer.
Finally, it tells us how the function g+ (which determines
the risk exposure e(a; s) as a function of the vulnerability of
neighboring nodes) influences how much penalty we should
impose on agents for externalities they produce. For this
reason, it reveals how the ‘shape’ of the function g+ affects
the necessary penalty. Thus, this finding might be useful for
designing a guideline for internalizing the externalities so as to
improve overall security and reduce the social cost, assuming
that we can estimate the function g+.
Example: g+(z) = a zb, a, b > 0 – Suppose that the
function g+ can be approximated by a power function over an
interval of interest to us. In this case, Assumption 4 holds
and Corollary 3 tells us that the unique NE of the modi-
fied population game minimizes the social cost. Furthermore,
ϑ(z) = a(1 + b)zb = (1 + b)g+(z) and the risk seen by a
node from a neighbor is scaled by (1 + b) in the altered cost
function in (10). Therefore, the penalty that we need to levy
on agents in order to achieve the minimum social cost at an
NE can be easily obtained from the risk or losses that a node
experiences due to indirect attacks from its neighbors. To be
precise, the penalty should be set to b times the losses from
9indirect attacks.6
This observation is quite intuitive; as b increases, the risk
from/to a neighbor becomes more sensitive to a change in
ρ(a; s) = w(s)Tp(a) or, equivalently, a change in the security
investments of players. As a result, when a player reduces its
security investment, it causes higher negative externalities to
its neighbors, thereby calling for a higher penalty.
VI. EFFECTS OF NODE DEGREE DISTRIBUTION ON
EXTERNALITIES AND RISK EXPOSURE
Recall that, for a given pure strategy profile a, the risk ex-
posure, hence the necessary penalties or taxes for internalizing
externalities, is a function of the node degree distribution (via
w(s)Tp(a)). Hence, it is of interest to understand the effects
of node degree distribution, which reflects to some extent the
level of interdependence in security among players, on their
security investments at both the NEs of population games and
social optima.
Theorem 3: Let s1 and s2 be two population size vectors
that satisfy
d∑
`=1
w`(s
1) ≤
d∑
`=1
w`(s
2) for all d ∈ D (11)
and ai = aNE(si), i = 1, 2. Then, e(a1; s1) ≤ e(a2; s2).
Consequently, a1d ≤ a2d for all d ∈ D. Furthermore, if the
inequality in (11) is strict for some d ∈ D and a2 lies in the
interior of ADmax , then e(a1; s1) < e(a2; s2).
Proof: A proof is given in Appendix D.
If the inequality in (11) is strict for some d ∈ D, i.e.,
w(s1) 6= w(s2), w(s1) first-order stochastically dominates
w(s2) [38]. Thus, the first part of Theorem 3 states that, as
the weighted node degree distribution becomes (stochastically)
larger, the risk exposure at the NE declines. What is somewhat
surprising is that the risk exposure falls even though every
population d invests less in security and is more vulnerable to
attacks because a1d ≤ a2d for all d ∈ D.
The intuition behind these perhaps counterintuitive findings
is that, as the degrees of neighbors rise (with stochastically
larger weighted node degree distributions), a node with a fixed
degree, say d, experiences diminished risk from its neighbors
because nodes with higher degrees, which see larger risks
and invest more in security, are better protected as captured
by Corollary 1. As a consequence, the node enjoys greater
positive externalities from its neighbors and reduces its own
security investments.
Suppose that Assumption 4 holds and, hence, there exists a
unique minimizer of social cost. We shall use a?(s) to denote
the unique minimizer of the social cost for fixed population
size vector s. When there is no confusion, we simply denote it
by a?. The following theorem tells us that, analogously to the
finding in Theorem 3, the risk exposure at the social optimum
also drops as the weighted node degree distribution becomes
6When most of attacks experienced by a node are indirect attacks, the
penalty would be approximately equal to b times the total losses. This might
be a reasonable approximation for nodes with large degrees (so-called hubs)
or when the network is highly connected.
larger.
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumption 4 is true. Let s1 and
s2 be two population size vectors that satisfy
d∑
`=1
w`(s
1) ≤
d∑
`=1
w`(s
2) for all d ∈ D. (11)
Then, e
(
a?(s1); s1
) ≤ e(a?(s2); s2). Moreover, if the inequal-
ity in (11) is strict for some d ∈ D and a?(s2) lies in the
interior of ADmax , then the inequality is strict.
Proof: Please see Appendix E for a proof.
Theorems 3 and 4 state that the risk exposure at both
NEs and social optima tends to decline as the weighted node
degree distribution becomes larger. Hence, our results indicate
that both in the distributed case with selfish agents and in
the centralized case with SP, higher network connectivity
will likely improve local network security measured by risk
exposure and, hence, the risk seen by a node with a fixed
degree.
At the same time, our findings in [25] reveal that the global
network security may in fact deteriorate; a key observation of
[25] is that as the weighted node degree distribution becomes
larger, the cascade probability (i.e., the probability that a
random single infection leads to a cascade of infection to a
large number of nodes) rises. Hence, together, these findings
suggest that, as the weighted node degree distribution gets
larger, individual nodes with fixed degrees might perceive
improved local security because the average number of attacks
they see falls, whereas the global network security degrades
in that even a single successful infection may spread to a large
number of other nodes in the network with higher probability.
Corollary 3 offers some intuition as to why the NEs of
population games and social optima possess similar properties
shown in Theorems 3 and 4; social optima can be viewed
as the pure-strategy NEs of related population games with
modified cost functions.
The claims in Theorem 3 or 4 do not always hold when we
replace the weighted node degree distributions in (11) with
the node degree distributions of two population sizes. In other
words, we can find two population size vectors s˜1 and s˜2 such
that
d∑
`=1
s˜1` ≤
d∑
`=1
s˜2` for all d ∈ D,
but the claims in Theorem 3 or 4 fail to hold.
The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for the
condition (11).
Lemma 2: Suppose that two population size vectors s1 and
s2 satisfy
s2d
s1d
≥ s
2
d+1
s1d+1
for all d ∈ D− := {1, 2, . . . , Dmax − 1}. (12)
Then, the condition (11) in Theorems 3 and 4 is satisfied.
Proof: Please see Appendix F for a proof.
The finding in Lemma 2 can be applied to several well
known families of distributions. For example, consider a
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family of (truncated) power law degree distributions {sα; α ∈
IR+}, where sαd ∝ d−α, d ∈ D. Suppose that α1 ≤ α2. Then,
one can easily show that sα1 and sα2 satisfy (12) as follows:
d−α2
d−α1
= d−(α2−α1) ≥ (d+ 1)−(α2−α1) = (d+ 1)
−α2
(d+ 1)−α1
because α2 − α1 ≥ 0.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results to vali-
date our main findings and to explore how the sensitivity of
the risk exposure to security investments of agents (i.e., the
derivative of g+) and the infection probability function p affect
the inefficiency of NEs.
For numerical studies, we use truncated power law degree
distributions with varying parameter α. The infection probabil-
ity is equal to p(a) = (1+a)−ζ with ζ > 0. The risk exposure
function g+ is given by e(a; s) = g+(ρ(a; s)) = 30(ρ(a; s))b
for b = 1.1 and 2.0. Recall from the discussion in Section
V-D that the employed risk exposure function g+ satisfies As-
sumption 4 and the unique (pure-strategy) NE of the modified
population game coincides with the unique global minimizer
of social cost.
The values of remaining parameters are provided in Table I.
We picked large Imax on purpose so that there is no budget
constraint at the NE or social optimum.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Dmax 20 L 10
τA 0.7 βIA 1.0
A [0, 1000] ζ 1.5 or 2.5
b 1.1 or 2.0
TABLE I
PARAMETER VALUES.
Fig. 1 plots the risk exposure and social cost at both NEs and
social optima as well as the so-called price of anarchy (PoA)
for ζ = 1.5 as we vary the value of power law parameter
α. The PoA is defined to be the ratio of the social cost at
the worst NE to the minimum achievable social cost, and is
a popular measure of the inefficiency of NE. Lemma 2 tells
us that as α increases, the weighted degree distribution w
becomes stochastically smaller. Thus, Theorems 3 and 4 state
that the risk exposure rises at both NEs and social optima.
This is confirmed by Fig. 1(a).
Our analytical findings, however, do not suggest how the
social cost would behave with increasing α. Fig. 1(b) shows
that the social cost in fact decreases with α in spite of increas-
ing risk exposure. This is because the underlying dependence
graph becomes less connected and nodes have smaller degrees.
In addition, Figs. 1(b) and 1(c) indicate that the gap between
the NE and social optimum widens both in risk exposure
and social cost as the risk exposure (i.e., g+) becomes more
sensitive to the security investments when b is raised to 2.0
from 1.1, thereby causing higher PoA. This observation is
intuitive; when the risk exposure is more sensitive to security
investments, when agents make less security investments at the
NE compared to the social optimum, it leads to larger increase
in risk exposure and social cost.
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Fig. 1. (a) Risk exposure, (b) social cost and (c) price of anarchy (ζ = 1.5).
Finally, Fig. 1(c) illustrates that the PoA is larger when the
dependence graph is more densely connected. This observation
is consistent with that of [25]: Theorem 7 of [25] proves a
tight upper bound on PoA, which is an affine function of the
average node degree. Thus, as the dependence graph becomes
more connected, leading to a higher average node degree, the
NE becomes less efficient in that the PoA escalates.
In order to examine how the infection probability function
p influences the risk exposure and social cost, we plot them
for ζ = 2.5 (with the remaining parameters being identical
as before) in Fig. 2. This represents a scenario in which
the available security measures are more effective in that
the infection probability falls more quickly with increasing
security investments.
Comparing Figs. 1 and 2, we observe that although the final
risk exposure and social costs are smaller than in the previous
case with ζ = 1.5, their qualitative behavior remains similar.
This indicates that as the security measures improve, both the
risk exposure and the social cost will likely drop. However,
we suspect that the properties of underlying dependence graph
will have comparable effects on them.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We examined how we could internalize the externalities
produced by security investments of selfish agents in IDS
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Fig. 2. (a) Risk exposure, (b) social cost and (c) price of anarchy (ζ = 2.5).
settings. Our study brought to light an interesting relation
between the local minimizers of social cost and the pure-
strategy NEs of a related population game in which the costs
of agents are modified to reflect their contributions to social
cost. Making use of this relation, we demonstrated that it is
possible to reduce the social cost and enhance the security by
imposing appropriate penalties on the agents on the basis of
the losses they suffer as a result of indirect attacks from their
neighbors. Finally, we proved that as the security of agents
becomes more interdependent and the weighted node degree
distribution becomes stochastically larger, the local security
experienced by a node with a fixed degree improves.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let H : ADmax → ADmax , where Hd(a) = Iopt(τA + d ·
e(a; s)), d ∈ D. Then, from Assumption 1 and the definition of
Iopt, the mapping H is continuous. Therefore, since ADmax
is a compact, convex subset of IRDmax , the Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem tells us that there exists a fixed point of H , say
a′, such that H(a′) = a′. It is clear from the definition of a
pure-strategy NE in Definition 1 that a′ is a pure-strategy NE.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Before we proceed with the proof of theorem, recall that
e(a; s) = g(γavg(a; s)) = g
+(ρ(a; s)), where γavg(a; s) =
τA βIA w(s)
Tp(a) = τA βIA ρ(a; s) and ρ(a; s) =
w(s)Tp(a).
In order to prove the theorem, we will first show that if a1
and a2 are two pure-strategy NEs, then e(a1; s) = e(a2; s).
We will prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose that the
claim is false and the risk exposures are not the same. Without
loss of generality, assume e(a1; s) < e(a2; s). Together with
Corollary 1, this implies p(a1d) ≥ p(a2d) for all d ∈ D and,
consequently,
e(a1; s) = g+
(
w(s)Tp(a1)
)
≥ g+(w(s)Tp(a2)) = e(a2; s),
which contradicts the earlier assumption e(a1; s) < e(a2; s).
The theorem is now a direct consequence of this claim and
Corollary 1; if the theorem is false and there exist two distinct
pure-strategy NEs a1 and a2, it necessarily implies that there
is some d′ ∈ D such that a1d′ < a2d′ . However, this is possible
only if e(a1; s) < e(a2; s) by Corollary 1, which contradicts
the claim proved above.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, a local minimizer of social cost, say a?, must satisfy
the first-order necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tion [6]: There exist non-negative KKT multipliers λ =
(λd; d ∈ D) and µ = (µd; d ∈ D) such that, for all d ∈ D,
c1. ∂∂ad C˜T (a
?, s) = λd − µd, and
c2. λd(a?d − Imin) = 0 and µd(Imax − a?d) = 0.
From (8) and (9),
∂
∂ad
C˜T (a
?, s) =
∑
d′∈D
∂
∂ad
C˜(a?, d′, s)
=
∂
∂ad
e(a?; s)
∑
d′∈D
sd′ d
′ L(a?d′)
+sd
((
τA + d e(a
?; s)
)
L p˙(a?d) + 1
)
,
where
∂
∂ad
e(a?; s) = g˙+
(
w(s)Tp(a?)
)
wd(s) p˙(a
?
d)
= g˙+(ρ(a?; s)) wd(s) p˙(a
?
d).
Substituting wd(s) = d · sd/davg(s) and using e(a; s) =
g+
(
ρ(a; s)
)
in the KKT conditions, we obtain
∂
∂ad
C˜T (a
?, s)
= sd d g˙
+(ρ(a?; s)) ρ(a?; s) L p˙(a?d)
+sd
(
(τA + d e(a
?; s))L p˙(a?d) + 1
)
= sd
((
τA + d ϑ(ρ(a
?; s))
)
L p˙(a?d) + 1
)
= λd − µd. (13)
12
Dividing both sides by sd yields(
τA + d ϑ(ρ(a
?; s))
)
L p˙(a?d) + 1 =
λd − µd
sd
= λnd − µnd , (14)
where λnd = λd/sd and µ
n
d = µd/sd.
At a pure-strategy NE of the modified population game,
amc, a player in population d faces the constrained convex
optimization problem
min
a∈A
(
τA + d ϑ(ρ(a
mc; s))
)
L(a) + a.
From the definition of NE, the first-order necessary and
sufficient KKT condition states that there exist non-negative
KKT multipliers λ˜d and µ˜d such that(
τA + d ϑ(ρ(a
mc; s))
)
L p˙(amcd ) + 1 = λ˜d − µ˜d. (15)
By comparing (14) and (15), we see that the local minimizer
a?, which satisfies the first-order necessary KKT conditions in
(14), also meets the sufficient conditions in (15) with λ˜d = λnd
and µ˜d = µnd for all d ∈ D. Therefore, it is a pure-strategy
NE of the modified population game.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Suppose that the first part of the theorem is false and
e(a1; s1) > e(a2; s2). By Corollary 1, this implies that, for
all d ∈ D,
p(a1d) ≤ p(a2d). (16)
Using e(a; s) = g+
(
w(s)Tp(a)
)
defined in Section III-A,
e(a2; s2) = g+
(
w(s2)Tp(a2d)
)
≥ g+(w(s2)Tp(a1d)) (17)
≥ g+(w(s1)Tp(a1d)) (18)
= e(a1; s1),
which contradicts the earlier assumption. The first inequality
in (17) follows from (16), and the second inequality in (18)
is a consequence of the condition (11) in Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1, i.e., p(aid) ≤ p(aid′) if d ≥ d′, i = 1, 2.
The claim a1d ≤ a2d for all d ∈ D is an immediate
consequence of the first part and Corollary 1, which states that
the optimal investment is nondecreasing in the risk exposure
seen by the players.
The second part of the theorem is true because, under
the stated assumptions that w(s1) first-order stochastically
dominates w(s2) and a2 ∈ int(ADmax ), the inequality (18) is
strict as a consequence of (the strict inequality in) Corollary 1.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We prove the first part of the theorem by contradic-
tion. Suppose that the claim is false and e(a?(s1); s1) >
e(a?(s2); s2). First, note that Corollary 3 tells us that a?(si),
i = 1, 2, are the unique pure-strategy NE of the modified
population games, and a?d(s
i) ≤ a?d+1(si) for all d =
1, . . . , Dmax−1. Together with this observation, the condition
(11) in the theorem tells us that if a?d(s
1) ≥ a?d(s2) for all
d ∈ D, then ρ(a?(s1); s1) ≤ ρ(a?(s2); s2). Consequently,
e(a?(s1); s1) ≤ e(a?(s2); s2), thereby contradicting the as-
sumption e(a?(s1); s1) > e(a?(s2); s2). Therefore, there must
exist some d∗ ∈ D such that
a?d∗(s
1) < a?d∗(s
2). (19)
We will show that this contradicts the assumption that a?(s1)
minimizes the social cost. For notational simplicity, we denote
a?(si), i = 1, 2, by ai throughout the proof.
The first-order necessary KKT conditions tell us that there
exist non-negative KKT multipliers λi = (λid; d ∈ D) and
µi = (µid; d ∈ D), i = 1, 2, which satisfy
λid(a
i
d − Imin) = 0, µid(Imax − aid) = 0, and
∂
∂ad
C˜T (a
i, si) = λid − µid, for all d ∈ D. (20)
Recall from (13) in Appendix C,
∂
∂ad∗
C˜T (a
1, s1)
= s1d∗
((
τA + d
∗ ϑ(ρ(a1; s1))
)
L p˙(a1d∗) + 1
)
= λ1d∗ − µ1d∗ . (21)
However, because a1d∗ < a
2
d∗ ≤ Imax, we have µ1d∗ = 0.
Setting µ1d∗ = 0 and dividing both sides of (21) by s
1
d∗ , we
get
((
τA + d
∗ ϑ(ρ(a1; s1))
)
L p˙(a1d∗) + 1
)
=
λ1d∗
s1d∗
≥ 0. (22)
Similarly, since a2d∗ > a
1
d∗ ≥ 0, we have λ2d∗ = 0 and
∂
∂ad∗
C˜T (a
2, s2)
= s2d∗
((
τA + d
∗ ϑ(ρ(a2; s2))
)
L p˙(a2d∗) + 1
)
= −µ2d∗ .
Normalizing both sides by s2d∗ ,((
τA + d
∗ ϑ(ρ(a2; s2))
)
L p˙(a2d∗) + 1
)
=
−µ2d∗
s2d∗
≤ 0. (23)
Recall that we assumed e(a1; s1) > e(a2; s2), hence
ρ(a1; s1) > ρ(a2; s2). In addition, by Assumption 1, because
a1d∗ < a
2
d∗ , we have p˙(a
1
d∗) < p˙(a
2
d∗) < 0. Therefore, together
with Assumption 4, we have
0 ≤ (22) < (23) ≤ 0
which is a contradiction.
To prove the second part of the theorem, first note that the
proof of the first part tells us a?(s1) ≥ a?(s2), where the
inequality is elementwise. Second, under the stated assumption
a?(s2) ∈ int(ADmax ), Corollaries 1 and 3 imply a?d(s2) <
a?d+1(s
2) for all d = 1, 2, . . . , Dmax − 1. Finally, together
with these observations, the first-order stochastic dominance
of w(s1) over w(s2) leads to e(a?(s1); s1) < e(a?(s2); s2).
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The following lemma will be used to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 3: Suppose that a = (a`; ` = 1, . . . ,K) and b =
(b`; ` = 1, . . . ,K) are two finite sequences of nonnegative real
numbers of length K > 1 and satisfy
b`+1
a`+1
≤ b`
a`
for all ` = 1, . . . ,K − 1. (24)
Then, ∑k
`=1 b`∑k
`=1 a`
≥
∑K
`=1 b`∑K
`=1 a`
for all k = 1, . . . ,K. (25)
Proceeding with the proof of Lemma 2, recall that the
condition (12) in Lemma 2 states
(d+ 1) s2d+1
(d+ 1) s1d+1
≤ d · s
2
d
d · s1d
for all d ∈ D−. (26)
From the definition of wd, the condition (11) is equivalent to∑d
`=1 ` · s2`∑d
`=1 ` · s1`
≥
∑Dmax
`=1 ` · s2`∑Dmax
`=1 ` · s1`
for all d ∈ D. (27)
Let a = (ad; d ∈ D) and b = (bd; d ∈ D), where ad =
d ·s1d and bd = d ·s2d. The inequalities in (27) can be rewritten
in terms of a and b as∑d
`=1 b`∑d
`=1 a`
≥
∑Dmax
`=1 b`∑Dmax
`=1 a`
for all d ∈ D. (28)
Moreover, (26) implies (bd+1/ad+1) ≤ (bd/ad), d ∈ D−. The
claim of Lemma 2 in (28) now follows directly from Lemma 3.
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